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Objective: To understand how the governance structure between producers and slaughter cooperatives of specialty beef chain in Paraná, Brazil, influence innovation and the remuneration of the value generated.Methodology: Semi-structured interviews were performed with 17 agents from two cooperatives and producers in the specialty beef chain in Paraná, Brazil. Originality: This study seeks to fill a gap in the literature by combining innovation and efficiency theories to assess how agents organize themselves enable them to create and remunerate the value generated.Main results: This study shows that producers and cooperatives organize themselves in a hybrid form involving verbal agreements which enable innovations due to information exchanges between producers. However, possible failures in value distribution stem from the non-remuneration of quality attributes, which may discourage innovations and the performance of the chain.Managerial contributions: Despite failures, cooperatives promote innovation and are a viable alternative for producers to compete in the market. Incentives can mitigate the risks associated with the observed failures. This study provides insights for private and public actions to encourage the formation of these arrangements and to improve the coordination of innovation subsystems.Theoretical contributions: Since efficiency theories underestimate innovation, our analysis employed efficiency and innovation theories, contributing to the better understanding of subsystems which depend on innovation to produce specialty products.
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