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This paper shows how the reference to the founding fathers of political economy is necessary to understand the nature of rules. Our thesis is that conventional and contractual constitutional rules must be compared through the contrast between sensualism and rationalism. Conventions as emerging and spontaneous rules provide a succesful basis for a stable social order in a sensualist and local setting only. Free riding would result from rationality, thereby precluding the propagation of theses rules. Conversely, a sensualist moral sentiment, sympathy, which is based on human propension to cooperate allows a social stability. When larger spaces are concerned, conventions are usually crystallized into constitutions. However, sympathy is a "scarce feeling". Most of the time, this process amounts to a reification of practices to the bets advantage of established groups. By contrasxt, we evidence how social contract may both stop conflicts among rational individual in a hobbesian state of nature and, by delineating precise domains of competence, prevent private and opportunist use of power by governments.
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